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“The  revolution  in  the  GDR  is  so  fascinating  because  it  both  occurred  
spontaneously and ensued nonviolently.” (Opp, Voss, and Gem 1995: 225)
Among cases of transition to democracy from below, the East German 
example  constitutes  a  particularly  challenging  puzzle.  Whereas  social 
movements taking advantage of oppositional space within a repressive context 
have preceded many transitions, the East German case of the fall of 1989 shows 
little  evidence  of  such large-scale  prior  opposition.  Even when compared to 
other Eastern European transitions, East Germany is unique in that no major 
opposition group existed prior to the revolution. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
Solidarity  and  Charter  77  came  to  symbolize  inextinguishable  pockets  of 
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Abstract:  Among cases of transition to  democracy from below, the East  German one 
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opposition.  While  the  latter  was  relatively  easily  controlled  by  the 
Czechoslovakian government in its first decade of existence, it still served as a 
powerful  example  of  opposition to  the regime.  In the GDR,  opposition was 
arguably  even  weaker  and  more  fragmented.  Peace  and  environmental 
movements  existed  in  the  decade  leading  up  to  the  transition,  but  few 
democratization initiatives emerged before Gorbachev proclaimed his  reform 
program in 1985. Even when such civil society groups did form in the second 
half of the decade they remained largely unknown and inconsequential. 
Still,  civil  society groups played important roles in the 1980s.  Despite 
being unable to challenge the regime, they began to create the political space 
necessary  for  a  protest  culture  to  emerge.  In  fact,  the  development  of  civil 
society groups assumed an almost  evolutionary character as religious groups 
gave  way  to  peace  and  environmental  movements  that  were  eventually 
transformed into democratization initiatives. This report seeks to highlight some 
of the most important civil society tendencies present in the GDR and to situate 
them in the domestic and international contexts that made a mass-based push for 
democratization possible in the fall of 1989. Furthermore, the report argues that 
the relative lack of coherent civil society organizations makes the East German 
transition to democracy a pure example of democratization from below, since 
opposition elites had little impact on the progression of the revolution.
Periodization
At first sight the democratization of East Germany appears to have been a very 
short  process.  The first  major  protests  against  the ruling  SED (the  Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany or Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) occurred 
as late as September 1989. Two months later, the checkpoints in the Wall that 
had served to keep the citizens of  the GDR (German Democratic Republic) 
from escaping to the West had been opened and the Wall itself was being torn 
down by euphoric Germans from both sides of Berlin. Less than a year after 
that, on October 3, 1990, the two Germanies reunited, and on December 2 the 
resurrected nation held its first all-German elections since 1932 (König 1993; 
Nepstad 2011; Stokes 1993). It is thus tempting to argue, as some scholars have 
(König 1993: 386), that the democratization of the GDR was in effect roughly a 
12-month process. However, to accept this point of view is to overlook some 
important  historical  developments  that  significantly  impacted  the 
democratization process. In this section I will highlight the important landmarks 
that  should  arguably  be  included  in  any  discussion  of  East  Germany’s 
democratization. In doing so, I suggest that the country’s democratization from 
below began as early as 1953.
The popular uprising of 1953 constitutes one of the earliest upheavals in 
the  communist  bloc,  and precedes  both  the Hungarian  and Czechoslovakian 
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popular  challenges against  communist  regimes in  1956 and 1968.  When the 
SED  gained  control  of  the  state  in  1949,  USSR-imposed  communism  had 
already begun to take its toll on the economy, which struggled in the face of 
reparations and other war related expenses. By 1952, living standards in the new 
country had fallen below those of  1947,  and when Moscow refused to lend 
Berlin a helping hand in solving its economic problems in January 1952, things 
predictably took a turn for the worse. The situation deteriorated further in April 
of that year, when the Council of Ministers announced a number of price hikes 
and  the  discontinuation  of  food  subsidies  for  two  million  “non-essential” 
workers  (Stibbe  2006:  42).  In  a  move  that  infuriated  the  already  weathered 
workers, the government decreed in May that work norms in industry would be 
raised by 10 percent, meaning that workers output would have to increase by 
that rate while salaries would remain at the same levels. The purpose of these 
measures was to improve agricultural productivity in order to rectify the food 
shortages that had plagued the country since 1952, but the new policies were 
implemented  without  broad  discussion  in  the  lower  ranks  of  the  party,  and 
without the input of labor organizations such as the FDGB (Free German Trade 
Union  Federation).  As  a  result,  the  population’s  discontent  was  heightened 
(Stibbe 2006: 41-2)     
The actual uprising began when workers at a Berlin construction site held 
a  sit-down strike  in  protest  at  the  new work  quotas.  The  strikers  drafted  a 
resolution  they  collectively  delivered  to  the  Council  of  Ministers.  As  they 
marched down the streets of Berlin they chanted slogans such as “We want free 
elections!” and “We want to be free human beings, not slaves!” which suggests 
that the motivation for their protest activity was not only economic in nature, 
but also a political objection to the undemocratic rule of the SED. During the 
march the protesters were joined by bystanders, and by the time they reached 
the Council, somebody had proposed a general strike. Consequently, strikes and 
demonstrations  took place  throughout  East  Germany the  following  day,  and 
crowds frustrated by years of perceived mismanagement of the country relieved 
some of the pressure by attacking government offices (Nepstad 2011: 39-40). 
Stibbe (2006) has succinctly captured the scope of the protests in the following 
week: 
In  East  Berlin  an  estimated  90,000  people  poured  on  to  the  streets,  and 
throughout  East  Germany  the  number  of  demonstrators  swelled  to  around 
418,000. Strikes were called in  593 factories,  with just  under half  a million 
workers, or 5 per cent of the workforce, taking part. Outside Berlin, the areas 
most seriously affected were the industrial  regions of Halle,  Magdeburg and 
Leipzig,  traditionally  strongholds  of  the  German  left  and  the  workers’ 
movement; but there were also disturbances in many smaller towns as well.
(43-4)
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When the government failed to take control of the situation, the Soviet military 
commander in Berlin declared martial law and Soviet troops were called in to 
break up the demonstrations and restore order to the factories. As even these 
actions failed to pacify the protestors, the Soviet soldiers resorted to outright 
repression:  at  least  51  demonstrators  were  killed  and by  the  end of  August 
13,000  people  had  been  arrested.  Of  those  arrested,  1,400  received  life 
sentences and 200 were executed (Nepstad 2011; Stibbe 2006). While the larger 
demonstrations were crushed by June 17th, isolated incidents continued to occur 
for another week (Stibbe 2006: 44). While the uprising of 1953 represents a 
major event in the history of the GDR, and can be positioned as the beginning 
of  opposition to  the SED’s rule,  the incident  is  also noteworthy for  another 
reason: it  represents the last  major challenge to the communist  rulers before 
1989 (Port 2007: 2).
If one wants to take a shorter view of the democratization process, the 
Helsinki agreement of 1975, or even the initiation of West Germany’s (FRG) 
policy of  Ostpolitik (the opening of relations with the Eastern Bloc, and the 
GDR in particular) in the late 1960s and early 1970s can be viewed as starting 
points of the democratization process. Although Grieder (2006) points out that 
the precise role played by  Ostpolitik  in bringing about the fall of the GDR is 
open to debate, “it helped to create some important prerequisites for the 1989 
revolution” (160). On December 21, 1972, the two Germanies signed the “Basic 
Treaty,” which helped thaw relations between the two countries (Grieder 2006: 
161). Bonn’s strategy was to penetrate the Eastern Bloc with Western values in 
an attempt to reduce Cold War tensions. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 had 
similar strategic goals in mind, and I will return to the impact of détente in the 
next section. Yet another option is to make the ascension of Gorbachev to the 
Soviet premiership and his 1985 announcement of the twin reforms of glasnost 
and perestroika the beginning of democratization process. Without a doubt the 
“Gorbachev  effect”  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  dismantling  of  GDR 
communism, and this aspect of the democratization process will be discussed 
under the heading of “Contingent Political Opportunities.”
For social movement scholars it is tempting to identify the emergence of 
popular protests in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the starting point of the 
democratization  process.  As  I  will  show  below,  small-scale  activism 
commenced in the late 1970s after the Helsinki Agreement had been signed. 
Should one prefer to take a more short-term view of the transition and make 
these protests the starting point of the democratization process, then either the 
initiation of the “Peace Prayers” in 1982 or the first pro-democracy protests in 
1987 would be appropriate starting points.  My personal opinion, however, is 
that focusing on the immediate protest activities that preceded the fall of the 
GDR amounts to a failure to properly historicize the East German transition to 
democracy. I would therefore be inclined to pay some attention to the events of 
1953 and thereafter progress to the Helsinki Final Act as the starting point of the 
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relevant time period. 
But  what  about  an  end  point?  Here  one  could  settle  on  one  of  the 
following key moments:
1) The  deletion  of  the  SED’s  leading  role  in  East  Germany  from  the 
constitution on November 24, 1989
2) The resignation of all members of the Politburo and the Central Committee 
by December 4
3) The  national  roundtable  meetings  that  took  place  between  December  7, 
1989, and March 12, 1990
4) The creation of a unity “government of national responsibility” on February 
5, 1990
5) The first free and open East German election on March 18, 1990
6) The unification of the two Germanies on October 3, 1990
7) The all-German elections on December 2, 1990
    
My  inclination  would  be  to  take  unification  as  the  end  point,  simply 
because  it  so  definitively  prevented  any  real  risk  of  a  reversal  of  the 
democratization  process.  However,  as  far  as  mobilization  from  below  is 
concerned,  one  could  probably  end  the  investigation  long  before  that,  for 
example at the time of the March election.
Structural Conditions
It can be argued that two major structural conditions helped set the stage for the 
1989 revolution. Here it is important to note that these two conditions – the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 with its explicit commitment to human 
rights and the deteriorating economic situation of the GDR in the 1970s and 
1980s – did not by themselves cause the revolution. The Helsinki Agreement, in 
particular,  only assumed real  importance and revolutionary potential  when it 
was coupled with Gorbachev’s reform program in the mid-1980s. (I will discuss 
the  “Gorbachev  effect”  in  the  next  section  as  a  “contingent  political 
opportunity.”)  The economic downturn,  on the other  hand, spans too long a 
period to be identified as an immediate cause of the revolution. As we will see 
in the “protest section” of this report, economic grievances were not among the 
population’s top concerns in 1989. Nonetheless, the Helsinki agreement and the 
economic downturn did contribute to the creation of a “revolutionary situation” 
(Tilly 1978) in the late 1980s. 
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s decision to change the course of the FRG’s 
relations with the Eastern Bloc in general and the GDR in particular in the late 
1960s helped set the stage for rapprochement between the West the East. Unlike 
9
his  predecessors,  Brandt  recognized  the  potential  advantages  of  engaging 
Moscow  and  the  GDR  and  the  possible  benefits  of  providing  economic 
assistance to East Germany. As mentioned above, the so-called “Basic Treaty” 
between the two Germanies was signed in 1972. This agreement acknowledged 
the existence of “two German states in one nation” and allowed the FRG to 
abandon the Hallstein Doctrine,  which mandated that  West  Germany abstain 
from full  diplomatic  relations  with  any  country,  other  than  the  USSR,  that 
recognized the GDR (Grieder 2006: 160-1). 
Brandt’s efforts to normalize relations with his eastern neighbor was only 
the first step in the détente that was to take place between the blocs in the mid-
1970s. As Dale (2005) has noted, within this process “the trickiest problems for 
the SED was its participation in the Conference for Security and Co-operation 
in  Europe  (CSCE)  talks,  which  culminated  in  Honecker’s  signing  of  the 
Helsinki Declaration in 1975” (86). The East German leader, like most of the 
Eastern bloc colleagues, considered the signing of the Final Act a success as it 
“bound signatory states to mutual recognition of territorial integrity, including 
respect  for  existing  borders”  (Dale  2005:  86).  This  meant  that  the  borders 
established at the end of World War II were considered legal by all parties, and 
in  effect  made  it  impossible  for  the  West  to  deny  the  existence  of  an  East 
Germany independent from its Western counterpart. However, in exchange for 
the West’s territorial concessions, all signatories of the Final Act committed to 
respect human and civil rights by virtue of the provisions contained within the 
“third  basket”  of  the  agreement.  By  signing  the  document  the  communist 
regime therefore bound itself to uphold many rights it would find difficult to 
respect, including the right to international travel, the right to family contact, 
and the right to freedom of information. While the GDR leadership had no real 
intention of honoring this commitment, it did nevertheless publish the complete 
treaty  in  the official  newspaper  Neues Deutschland.  As a consequence,  East 
Germans drew their  own conclusions  based on the agreement  and began to 
apply for exit visas in significant numbers. When word began to spread that 
visas  were  indeed  being  granted,  the  number  of  applications  increased 
exponentially. Whereas the late 1970s witnessed an average of 7,200 first-time 
applications  and the  granting of  4,600 exit  visas  per  year,  the  numbers  had 
reached 12,600 annual applications and 7,000 visas by the early 1980s. In 1984 
the visa numbers peaked at 57,600 applications and 29,800 visas (Dale 2005: 
87). According to Norman Naimark (1992) the numbers of visa applicants were 
even higher. According to him “soon after the Helsinki agreement was signed 
… some 100,000 to 200,000 GDR citizens applied for an exit visa” and those 
who applied often cited “the 
Helsinki provisions that guaranteed the right of free emigration” (78-9).1 
1Grieder (2006: 162) reports similarly high numbers of visa applicants following the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act. Dale (2005: 88) confirms the common reference to the agreement among would-be emigrants by 
pointing to a 1976 petition signed by visa applicants in Riesa that “called upon the government to honour the 
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While numbers remained high throughout the rest of the GDR’s existence, it is 
worth noting that the numbers fell slightly beginning in 1985 (Dale 2005: 87), 
perhaps suggesting popular recognition that the emergence of Gorbachev had 
made the prospect of reform in East Germany feasible, and that people were 
therefore opting for “voice” over “exit.”
While it  is  tempting to assume that the GDR’s commitment to human 
rights could not have elicited any sort of meaningful oppositional response from 
a  population  used  to  the  state’s  empty  rhetoric,  Steven  Pfaff  (2006),  citing 
Sidney Tarrow, has argued that such an assumption misses the point. Tarrow 
“explains that even if it was only meant as a formal gesture, the endorsement of 
the  Helsinki  accords  provided  a  common  metric  with  which  Soviet  bloc 
dissidents  could  evaluate  government  actions  and  frame  their  opposition  in 
language that would gain foreign sympathy for their struggles” (Pfaff 2006: 90). 
Going a step further in his line of reasoning, this time leaning on the work of 
Keck and Sikkink, Pfaff (2006) convincingly suggests that “in the late 1980s 
East  German  dissidents  found  that  human  rights  messages  resonated  with 
Western journalists  and humanitarian organizations,  whose attention afforded 
some protection. And with so many East German households watching German 
television,  coverage  of  dissidents  expressing  human  rights  claims  often 
“boomeranged” back into the GDR on the nightly news” (90).      
The Helsinki Agreement provided those looking to leave the GDR with a 
legal  framework within which to  present  their  demands.  While  the wave of 
potential emigrants amounted to an administrative and political nightmare, one 
should not overlook the fact that this development also afforded the government 
the possibility to relieve some of the pressure it  was facing from those East 
Germans  most  disgruntled  with  the  regime’s  policies.  By  allowing  some 
dissidents to leave the country, the government could claim to be abiding by the 
CSCE treaty and thus earn some credit abroad. Besides international goodwill, 
the voluntary departure of some of the more vocal critics of the regime meant 
that the government bought itself some respite from internal opposition. Some 
of those opting to exit the GDR in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s were 
political prisoners for whom the West German government in Bonn paid its East 
German  counterpart  around  70,000  Deutschmarks  each.  This  questionable 
“trade” brought the GDR leadership 3.4 billion Deutschmarks, a significant sum 
that helped mitigate some of the accumulating economic losses of the country. 
Yet despite these benefits for the state one must not fail to recognize that on the 
whole the wave of exits made for  a dangerous precedent.  As Dale correctly 
points out, “in the long term, the threat arose of the general public coming to 
support the right to emigrate” (Dale 2005: 87). On a final note, it should be 
noted that “the SED’s need to avoid public displays of repression in the era of 
Helsinki agreements and appealed to other international actors (including the United Nations) to press for the 
same.”
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Helsinki” contributed to its decision to use the country’s Protestant Churches as 
outlets of popular discontent (Grieder 2006: 162); but I will return to this in my 
discussion of civil society. 
If the Helsinki Final Act and its accompanying human rights framework 
represent  the  first  important  structural  condition  of  the  East  German 
democratization  process,  then  the  country’s  failing  economy  constitutes  the 
second.  According  to  Grieder  (2006),  “the  most  damaging  and 
counterproductive aspect of this dictatorship was its bureaucratic stranglehold 
on the economy” (159). Once ranked as the 10th industrial power in the world, 
by 1988 the GDR had fallen to 26th place. Some of the reasons for this economic 
decay  included  the  country’s  inability  to  keep  pace  with  technological 
developments and declining demand for East German products. By 1989, the 
country had amassed a foreign debt of $26.5 billion (Nepstad 2011: 44). Unlike 
his  predecessors,  Honecker  had  in  the  early  1970s  decided  to  abandon  the 
GDR’s decentralizing  economic  reforms and instead opted to  nationalize  all 
remaining privately and semi-privately operated businesses. While this system 
had worked relatively well for some of the less developed Soviet satellite states 
in Eastern Europe, in East Germany it was not an effective long-term policy 
since  the  economy  was  highly  advanced  and  diverse.  As  a  result,  these 
industries  began  to  experience  supply  problems  and  both  growth  and 
productivity rates plummeted. In addition to these production-related problems, 
the economy also suffered under the considerable weight of state funding for the 
army, the Stasi, and the state bureaucracy (Grieder 2006). As one scholar sums 
up the situation, “In many ways, then, East German totalitarianism was self-
defeating” (Grieder 2006: 159). The combination of a failing economy and a 
population ready to demand the human and political rights their government had 
committed itself to protecting made for a potentially explosive situation. The 
first  match  to  be  lit  under  this  democratization  brew  was  the  elevation  of 
Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet premiership in 1985 and his announcement of 
the twin policies of Glasnost and Perestroika.
Contingent Political Opportunities
In the previous section I identified the signing of the Helsinki Final Act as a 
central structural condition of the 1989 revolution and the subsequent transition 
to democracy. But if the most pertinent structural condition was in place as early 
as  1975,  why  did  the  revolution  not  occur  until  1989?  The  answer  to  this 
question is that although some Western pressure was being exerted on the GDR 
to live up to its human rights commitments, the USSR did not exert any similar 
pressure on Berlin. As a consequence, the regime’s violation of human rights, 
such as the right to international travel, went largely unpunished and did not 
upset the relationship between East Germany and its most important ally. This 
arrangement  changed  drastically  when  Mikhail  Gorbachev  became  General 
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Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 12, 
1985,  and  shortly  thereafter  announced  the  implementation  of  the  two new 
policies that would forever change not only Eastern Europe, but the continent as 
a whole, and indeed the world. Gorbachev considered Glasnost (openness) and 
perestroika (restructuring) essential components in his efforts to transform the 
Soviet  Union  into  a  more  efficient  and  competitive  nation.  Cold  War 
expenditures, including the arms race, had placed a significant burden on the 
Soviet state finances, which led the new premier to conclude that the country’s 
costly military presence throughout Europe increased the state’s vulnerability 
rather than its security. At the CPSU’s Central Committee plenum in February 
1988,  Gorbachev  therefore  announced  that  the  USSR  would  reduce  its 
international  presence,  and  “conceded  the  right  of  every  people  and  every 
country to ‘choose freely its social and political system’” (Grieder 2006: 164). 
Of course, Gorbachev did not intend for this policy change to lead to the fall of 
communism  in  Europe,  as  he  firmly  believed  that  each  communist  regime 
would be able  to reform itself  according to  the house rules of  glasnost and 
perestroika (Grieder  2006).  However,  the  Soviet  leader  appears  to  have 
underestimated the impact his policies would have not only on the regimes of 
Eastern Europe, but also on its populations.
While  Gorbachev may have been impervious to  the impact  his  policy 
announcement would have across Eastern Europe, the same cannot be said of 
the Stasi. As early as 1985 the state security agency “warned of growing interest 
in the ‘demagogic,’ ‘bourgeois-liberal’ conception of human rights and feared 
that  dissidents  might  mobilize  a  ‘democratic  mass  movement’”  that  “would 
‘intend to  put  permanent  pressure  on the  party  and state  leadership’” (Pfaff 
2006: 90-1). In other words, it appears East German activists had no difficulty 
recognizing  the  potential  opportunities  for  mobilization  represented  by 
Gorbachev’s reforms. For example, in 1986 human rights activist formed the 
Initiative  for  Peace  and  Human  Rights  (Initiative  für  Frieden  und 
Menschenrechte, IFM), which published “frequent reports on reforms” in the 
Eastern Bloc, as well as the Helsinki documents and the United Nations Charter 
on Human Rights in its entirety (Pfaff 2006: 91). Dale (2005) has suggested that 
Moscow’s “new thinking” constituted a greater threat to the GDR than any other 
country  in  the  region,  since  “the  SED’s  dependence  on  the  USSR  …  was 
absolute”  (121).  This  interpretation  is  supported  by the  fact  that  the  GDR’s 
revised constitution of 1974 states, in no uncertain language, that “the German 
Democratic Republic is forever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics,” which in turn leads Grieder to conclude that “the GDR’s 
dependence  on  the  Soviet  Union  was  ultimately  its  undoing”  (2006:  171). 
Similar  claims have been made about Czechoslovakia’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union, and while it is perhaps not a pressing task to ascertain which of 
the countries  had the most  dependent  relationship with the superpower,  it  is 
worth  emphasizing  that  Czechoslovakia  and  East  Germany  have  often  been 
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identified as the two most repressive and Moscow-faithful communist regimes. 
Perhaps not wholly coincidentally, these two countries were also the same that 
experienced  the  most  clear-cut  cases  of  nonviolent  revolutions  resting  on  a 
rhetorical framework of human rights.
While  the  USSR  repeatedly  professed  its  support  for  the  SED,  East 
German party  “leaders  knew that  they  could  no  longer  rely  on  the  type  of 
military intervention that the Kremlin provided during the 1953 uprising. Thus 
Soviet  withdrawal  of  economic  and  military  support  decreased  the  regime’s 
power and increased the opposition movements’ leverage” (Nepstad 2011: 43). 
As we will see in the “protest” section of this report, this knowledge resulted in 
a situation in which SED leaders were unwilling to order the all-out repression 
of unarmed demonstrators. Without Soviet military backing and support for its 
Stalinist ideology, the GDR leadership recognized that its position was tenuous 
at best when massive demonstrations broke out in September/October 1989. In 
short then, Gorbachev’s reforms represent, in my opinion, the main available 
political opportunity of the era, since the compatibility between human rights 
(Helsinki),  glasnost and  non-interference  (Gorbachev),  and  the  strategic 
decision to fight nonviolently (1989), created an incredibly potent revolutionary 
mix. 
A  few  other,  more  immediate,  political  opportunities  are  worth 
mentioning.  One  that  put  tremendous  pressure  on  the  GDR and  altered  the 
image of the regime’s being in control was Hungary’s decision to abandon a 
1969  agreement  between  the  two  countries  that  bound  each  government  to 
“honor  each  other’s  travel  restrictions.”  Communist  states  had  traditionally 
prevented each other’s citizens from exiting the Bloc, but on May 2, 1989, the 
Hungarian government decided to relax controls at its border with Austria, and 
many East Germans began to “illegally” exit Eastern Europe through Hungary. 
While  Berlin  was  less  than impressed with  this  perceived  act  of  Hungarian 
treason,  events  had  not  yet  reached  their  climax.  On  September  11th,  the 
Budapest government reached the conclusion that its main obligation was no 
longer to honor the 1969 treaty, or even an earlier 1956 agreement to hand over 
illegal visitors, but rather to uphold the United Nations agreement on refugees. 
This meant that East Germans could, by the tens of thousands, leave their home 
country relatively legally, and that there was little the government could do to 
stop  them.  What  was  perhaps  even  more  disconcerting  for  Berlin  was  that 
Moscow  observed  Budapest’s  decision  without  even  voicing  its  opposition 
(Dale 2005; Maier 1997; Naimark 1992). As Roger East (1992) puts it,  “the 
floodgates opened” (66)  and risked throwing the GDR into complete  chaos. 
Naturally,  this  weakened  the  regime  and  thereby  provided  activists  with 
increased opportunities to protest.
Another important political opportunity emerged with the local elections 
held in May 1989. Based on the fact that “properly conducted” elections had 
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been  held  in  the  Soviet  Union the  previous  year,  East  German voters  were 
disappointed  to  once  again  be  faced  with  choice-free  ballots.  Since  GDR 
elections  consisted  of  the  presentation  of  complete  slates  of  candidates  that 
voters  could  only  approve  or  disapprove,  activists  called  upon  citizens  to 
officially  register  their  discontent  by  voting  “no.”  Groups  connected  to  the 
Church then monitored many polling stations in order to assess the rate of “no” 
votes. But while observers estimated such votes at between 10 and 20 percent, 
the official result presented by the authorities showed that 98.85 percent of the 
electorate had approved of the government’s lists composed of National Front 
candidates.  In  response  to  this  alleged  fraud,  outraged  activists  called  for 
monthly protests on the seventh day of each month in Berlin. On June 7th, the 
day of the first protest, more than 100 demonstrators were arrested by the police 
and taken in for  questioning.  As a  clear  indication of  the changing political 
climate in the country, 1,500 activists joined a demonstration held the next day 
in protest against the arrests (Dale 2005; Naimark 1992; Saxonberg 2001).
One  final  political  opportunity  occurred  at  a  decisive  point  in  the 
revolutionary process. In early October, Gorbachev visited the GDR to attend 
the  country’s  40th anniversary  celebrations.  While  making  the  usual  polite 
speeches and giving the appropriate nods to Honecker and other SED leaders, 
Gorbachev also remained true to his political agenda. As the leader of the Soviet 
Union he could not be controlled by his East German hosts at all times, and he 
ordered his car to be stopped several times so that he could greet the people on 
the  street  who were  chanting  his  name,  by  now synonymous  with  calls  for 
democracy  and  human  rights.  “If  you  really  want  democracy,”  Gorbachev 
purportedly told the masses, “then take it, and you will have it!” (Reich 1990: 
85). While it remains questionable that the leader did indeed utter these words, 
his famous advice to Honecker contains no such doubts: “Those who come late 
will  be  punished by history” (Reich  1990:  85).  The East  German elites  did 
indeed come late, were punished by history, and are those to whom we now turn 
our attention.            
 
Elites
As in the case of Czechoslovakia, the matter of East German elites is fairly 
straightforward. For all meaningful purposes only one elite group existed: the 
leadership  of  the  SED.  The party  had cemented  its  position  by  including a 
reference to its leading role in the country’s constitution, and it was not until 
well after the fall of the wall that this stipulation was removed. Whereas the 
literature  on  democratization,  which  often  takes  an  elite-based  perspective, 
might expect the absence of competing elites to be beneficial for the SED, it 
seems  the  party’s  undisputed  position  at  the  top  of  the  social  hierarchy 
amounted to isolation rather than domination at the time of the crisis. Unlike 
dictators in Latin America for example, the political elites in the GDR had no 
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allies on whom they could rely. The nationalization of all industries meant that 
there were no economic elites that had an interest in promoting the status quo. 
Similarly, the armed forces, including the military, the Stasi, the police, and the 
militias, took their orders directly from the party. Orders on how to deal with 
demonstrators were supposed to be issued not by military commanders, but by 
the political leadership in Berlin. In short, the diversity of elites present in other 
authoritarian systems simply did not exist in the GDR, since the party sought to 
incorporate every element of society. 
But could this not have been a strength? The fact that there was only one 
elite group present should logically have eliminated the possibility of intra-elite 
divisions. Rather than worrying about landowners or military commanders, East 
Germany’s rulers only had to prevent divisions within their own close ranks in 
order to avoid the kind of ruptures that many democratization scholars consider 
crucial for state breakdown. This scenario may have played out had the SED 
leadership indeed been the sovereign rulers of the country. However, the SED 
leaders were not the absolute decision makers in the GDR. Instead, they were 
dependent on the support of Moscow. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the hollow nature of the SED’s power is 
the leadership’s response to the demonstrations of September and October 1989. 
A strong and independent East German leadership would have done what the 
Chinese communists did when their power was threatened in late spring that 
year — respond with overwhelming force. But despite the fact that the SED 
leadership  had  the  privilege  of  observing  the  effectiveness  of  a  “Chinese 
solution”  and  clearly  contemplated  one  of  their  own,  no  order  to  severely 
repress  the  pro-democracy  demonstrations  in  Leipzig  and  Berlin  was  ever 
issued. Scholars have shown that this was not due to the fact that Honecker, 
Mielke, Krenz, and others were sympathetic to the cause of the protesters, but 
simply because none of them wanted to be held responsible for a bloodbath that 
the  true  elites  of  the  GDR  — its  allies  in  Moscow  — would  undoubtedly 
disapprove of (Maier  1997; Naimark 1992; Nepstad 2011; Saxonberg 2001). 
The result of this dependent relationship with Moscow was that the SED, the 
sole and uncontested elite of the GDR, simply “withered away” in the face of 
initially  relatively  modest  demonstrations.  This  manifestation  of  a  complete 
absence of power is perhaps one of the most interesting puzzles of the Eastern 
European revolutions: communist/socialist  parties that had ruled supreme for 
nearly half a century were in fact Wizards of Oz — mythic structures without 
any real weight behind them once the USSR withdrew its unconditional support.
 Before moving on to the carriers of change in East Germany, it is worth 
pointing  out  that  the  weakness  of  the  GDR’s  elites  was  not  only  due  to 
Moscow’s withdrawn support. As Grieder (2006) has shown, the East German 
leadership was also 
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desperate to maintain stable relations with the Federal Republic [of Germany], 
not only because they craved international recognition, but also because they 
became more and more dependent on it for economic assistance. The result of 
this  increasingly lopsided relationship  was a  reduction in  overtly oppressive 
measures  taken  against  the  East  German  population.  …  When  the  regime 
abstained from using  force  to  crush the  revolution  of  1989,  this  was partly 
because it  feared  losing  its  hard-won international  status  and economic  aid. 
(163)
In a sense then, the regime was caught between a rock (Moscow) and a hard 
place (Bonn), which suggests that the strength of the East German leadership 
was nothing but a mirage. Its absence of strength meant that even a relatively 
unorganized, spontaneous revolution presented the SED leaders with a greater 
challenge than they could handle.
Civil Society
For years there had been dissidents in East Germany, just like those in Poland  
and Russia, but more hidden. Then in the early eighties we came to the surface.  
The  new  opposition  was  individualistic  and  bohemian,  and  composed  of  a  
kaleidoscope of  “counter-culture” social groups: hippies, Maoists, anarchists,  
human  rights  groups,  greens,  gays,  lesbians,  the  protesting  “church  from  
below”  –  a  very  colourful  mixture,  with  lots  of  rock  music;  in  fact,  to  
professional people and academics, frankly somewhat alien! (Reich 1990: 71-2)
Religious Movements
The role of the East German Church in the democratization process has been 
touched upon by virtually every main chronicler of the transition. The reason is 
plain:  the  Protestant  churches  played  a  central  part  in  the  democratization 
movement,  and  without  the  Church’s  assistance  it  is  likely  that  the  1989 
revolution would have looked very different. But the position of the Church was 
complex.  Throughout  the  SED’s  rule,  the  Church  had  often  found  itself  in 
opposition to state policy,  and “in certain respects the Church was a natural 
home for  critical  spirits”  (Dale  2005:  103).  Ever  since  the  early  1950s,  the 
Church  had  clashed  with  the  government  on  issues  such  as  conscientious 
objection in 1955, conscription in 1960, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1980. As in the Polish case, the Church had come to offer “a second public 
sphere” where at least some space for dissent could be found (Dale 2005: 103). 
The early 1970s represented a warming in relations between the state and the 
Church  as  the  Protestant  Church  officially  announced  its  acceptance  of  the 
state’s  legitimacy and asserted that  it  would from now on regard itself  as  a 
“Church in socialism.” In March 1978, the new friendship between state and 
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church culminated in an official agreement that afforded the Church hierarchy 
“acknowledged authority status” in exchange for  a more co-operative stance 
towards the regime. As a component of this new understanding between the two 
parties, “churches were permitted to act as arenas for the ventilation of dissent; 
their  public  meeting  rooms and printing  equipment  became available  to  the 
groups that gathered within their walls” (Dale 2005: 101). For dissidents, this 
amounted to an enormous improvement on the status quo. Prior to the 1978 
agreement,  oppositionists  had  to  gather  in  state-owned  institutions,  which 
naturally  provided  a  less  than  ideal  environment  for  the  free  expression  of 
opinions (Dale 2005).
But what drove the SED to make such a disastrous deal with the Church? 
Nepstad (2011: 41) has suggested that the relative weakness of the Church in 
the late 1970s made Honecker confident that the Party would be able to dictate 
the conditions of the alliance.  But  Grieder’s (2006) interpretation is  perhaps 
more convincing: in the aftermath of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement, the state 
was eager  to  “avoid public  displays  of  repression”  (162)  that  would clearly 
violate  the  terms  of  that  treaty.  Honecker  and  his  colleagues  reached  the 
conclusion that by allowing dissent to be institutionalized within the Church it 
would be easier to control and keep track of dissenters. Since the Church had 
agreed to be a “Church in socialism,” infiltration by the party should be easy to 
accomplish. However, the SED made a serious miscalculation when it assumed 
that the Church operated according to the same centralized principles as the rest 
of  the  socialist  apparatus.  While  the  leaders  of  the  Church  had  grown 
comfortable with the socialist status quo and had little sympathy for dissenters, 
their churches were also home to many “turbulent priests” lower down in the 
hierarchy who cared little for the communist state. These priests were more than 
willing  to  let  dissidents  use  Church  premises  for  organizing  purposes.  As 
Grieder thus concludes,  “the March 1978 agreement  was undoubtedly a key 
turning point in the history of the GDR” (2006: 162).
As we will see below, the Church played an important function as the 
host  of  various peace and ecological  groups.  Rather  tellingly,  most  of  these 
groups were neither religious in nature nor membership. However, they were 
more  than  happy  to  share  a  space  with  pastors  sympathetic  to  their  cause, 
although a majority of the protestant churches sided with the state against the 
opposition groups (Reich 1990: 72).  In addition to peace and environmental 
groups, some congregations sponsored human rights groups. For example, one 
East Berlin congregation allowed activists to use its facilities to produce reports 
that pointed to the discrepancy between international human rights standards 
and the actions of the SED. The reports were then distributed with a cover page 
reading “For Internal Church Use Only.” Naturally, the reports were distributed 
widely outside the church. The Stasi was well aware of this tactic, but “they 
were unable suppress it because of the church’s protective coverage” (Nepstad 
2011: 41). 
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In addition to harboring opposition groups, the Church, or at least some 
of its pastors, played a central role in the 1989 revolution. The “Peace Prayers” 
were the catalyst that triggered the nonviolent protests that brought down the 
SED regime. The practice of Peace Prayers was initiated in 1982 when Deacon 
Günter Johannsen began to hold weekly prayer meetings on Mondays at five 
o’clock at the Nikolaikirche in Leipzig (Maier 1997: 139). Even at this point in 
time,  years  before  Gorbachev  announced  his  reforms,  the  church  offered 
discontent  East  Germans some,  albeit  limited,  oppositional  space.  Still,  it  is 
important to note that the Church was indeed complex, as were its relationships 
with both the state and the opposition, and one should not therefore overstate its 
role in the democratization process. It is more fruitful and historically correct to 
emphasize  the  role  of  certain  pastors  and  congregations  (Dale  2005:  106). 
Nonetheless, the structural condition created by the détente between church and 
state did create the space necessary for the advent of an East German protest 
culture  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  long  before  any  democratization 
movement  existed.  Finally,  the  Church  and  its  pastors  helped  steer  the 
revolution in the direction of nonviolence in 1989. I will return to this aspect of 
the Church’s role in the discussion of “Protest” below.
New Social Movements  
One of the most important new social movements to emerge in the GDR in the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s was the peace movement. For natural reasons, 
many pastors were able to get behind this movement, and the peace movement 
was therefore one of the most likely beneficiaries of church support. As Dale 
(2005) explains, 
From 1979 until 1983 the autonomous peace movement went from strength to 
strength.  Communications  amongst  the  disparate  groups  improved,  and  a 
national co-ordinating centre was established. … Events with a peace theme 
became increasingly popular. Thousands attended Rainer Eppelmann’s “Blues 
services”, 3,500 came to an independent peace event in Potsdam in 1982, and 
around 10,000 congregated at a Christian peace festival in Eisenach. Alongside 
burgeoning  numbers,  a  minority  began  to  express  more  radical  opinions, 
arguing  that  activities  should  reach  beyond  the  confines  of  the  Church.  A 
number of attempts were made to hold public vigils: by “Women for Peace” in 
Berlin, and by activists around Roland Jahn in Jena, for example. The “Berlin 
Appeal”  of  January  1982,  launched  by  the  dissident  Communist  Robert 
Havemann and Reverend Eppelmann, raised taboo demands, a nuclear weapon-
free Europe, the withdrawal of all occupying forces from both German states 
and freedom of expression; and thereby confirmed the regime’s fears that the 
peace issue could stray towards explosive questions of the division of Germany, 
the GDR’s reliance on a foreign power, and civil liberties. A signal event, it was 
the  first  direct  appeal  to  the  general  public  on  behalf  of  an  independent 
movement and, despite references to so many forbidden themes, gathered over 
2,000 signatures. (Dale 2005: 101)
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This quote is informative for a few reasons. First, it concretely shows that peace 
activism did indeed take place in the early 1980s, but more crucially, it suggests 
that the peace movement was to become important not because of the subject it  
advocated, but because it had the potential to evolve into more regime critical 
activism. The Church had a legitimate interest in peace issues and organized the 
“Peace Decade” — a 10-day event held in November each year that included 
workshops,  prayer  services,  and dialogue that  all  focused on such issues  as 
nuclear  weapons,  militarism,  and  peace.  Many  activists  were  of  course 
concerned about the political situation in Europe at the time, but there was also 
another reason why peace activism became the dominant new social movement 
of  the early  1980s:  it  was certified by the state.  In  response  to  geopolitical 
events, and in particular the Cold War arms race, the SED had in effect created 
its own peace movement in the late 1970s. Since the regime itself advocated in 
favor of peace related issues it was difficult to criticize citizens doing likewise. 
Similarly, the environmental  movement that operated in parallel  to the 
peace movement was difficult to demonize since it provided the state with some 
important services, including the planting of trees. According to Dale (2005), 
the environmental movement grew out of the declining peace movement in the 
mid-1980s. Although environmental groups had been around since the 1970s, it 
was not until this point that they assumed importance. In the late 1970s East 
Germans  began  to  protest  on  ecological  grounds:  against  the  building  of  a 
highway, the destruction of a meadow, toxic waste dumps, and other similar 
issues. The tactics used were non-confrontational and included educational and 
letter writing campaigns (Dale 2005: 102).
In time, the movement’s ability to stage small protests led the regime to 
view it  as  a  potential  threat.  Because  West  Germans had recently  formed a 
Green Party, the SED were concerned that a similar development might occur in 
the GDR and a green opposition would emerge.  The regime’s response was to 
distinguish between those activists considered to be radical and those deemed 
harmless protectors of the environment. While the former were repressed, the 
latter  were encouraged and continued to advocate green issues  (Dale 2005: 
102-3). While this strategy made sense at the time, it still allowed mobilization 
to  take  place.  Seemingly  non-threatening  to  the  regime,  the  environmental 
movement provided those keen to express their opinion with an avenue to do so 
publicly.  In  this  way,  one  might  argue  that  even  semi-political  protest 
contributed to the emergence of a protest  culture in the mid and late 1980s. 
Towards the end of the decade, the environmental movements teamed up with 
churches to establish environmental libraries. “The first was formed in 1987 at 
East Berlin’s Zion Church, where activists reported on the state’s environmental 
abuses. Within two years, the number of church-based environmental libraries 
had grown to more than 20” (Nepstad 2011: 41). By then it was clear that the 
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movement was not as harmless as the regime had chosen to believe.
Both the peace and the environmental movements thus appear to have 
been  important  mainly  because  they  allowed  people  to  mobilize  on  semi-
political issues. The peace movement experienced significant setbacks in the 
mid-1980s  when  many  activists  escaped  the  GDR.  Still,  these  new  social 
movement  groups were important  to the development  of  a social  movement 
culture that took its place in the GDR in the mid 1980s. For example, many of 
those who had taken part in the peace and ecological movements were the very 
same  people  who  later  participated  in  the  democratization  movement  (Dale 
2005; Maier 1997).
Women played an important role in the revolution by participating in the 
demonstrations that eventually forced the regime to resign.  As one leader of 
New Forum explains:
Women played a fundamental part in making our revolution, and it, along with 
the role of young people, should be recognized. At an early stage, the sanctuary 
of the Gethsemane Church was the focus and the beacon of our movement. 
Every evening around the Gethsemane Church, people walked silently in the 
great ritual of our revolution. Women and young people enacted it, with candles, 
parading humbly and defencelessly but in awesome unity of purpose in front of 
the dreadful apparatus of State repression. The riot-police cordon, the armoured 
trucks,  the water cannon. They demonstrated without any sign of fear.  They 
quietly placed their candles on the street, sat down and waited until they were 
carried away or beaten up or arrested after Neues Forum had been declared 
illegal and unconstitutional. (Reich 1990: 88) 
In  addition,  women’s  activist  groups,  if  not  forming  an  outright  movement, 
existed alongside other civil society groups in the 1980s. 
The women’s movement had a long tradition in the GDR. As early as 
1947 women established the Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschland (DFD), 
which by the end of the year had 242,000 members. However, the organization 
was  soon  incorporated  by  the  state  and  became  a  tool  for  political 
indoctrination. In 1989, the DFD remained faithful to the regime and boasted 
almost  one  and  a  half  million  members  (Kranz  2010).  However,  some 
independent women’s groups came into existence in the 1980s, all under the 
umbrella of the Church. The overarching theme appears to have been issues of 
peace, which makes sense since this was the main concern of church-related 
activism at  the time,  but  women’s groups also campaigned for  the rights  of 
women  and  homosexuals  (Dale  2005:  106).  For  example,  in  1982  women 
established  the  group  Frauen  fur  den  Frieden,  which  mobilized  around  the 
issues of nuclear disarmament and the rights of conscientious objectors (Kranz 
2010). In the middle of the decade the group expanded its repertoire and began 
to  criticize  “the  educational  system  of  the  GDR  [which]  promoted  gender 
21
segregation, traditional gender roles, and military themes” (Kranz 2010: 8). 
By the time of the fall of the regime Frauen fur den Frieden no longer 
existed. 
When the first nationwide women’s meeting took place in 1988, Women for 
Peace had given up its original reasons for establishment and was dissolved into 
a network of various women’s,  peace,  and civil  groups whose main concern 
now  was  to  reform  the  existing  political  system  of  the  GDR  into  humane 
socialism with democratic features. The last official Women for Peace meeting 
mentioned in the archival records, took place in December 1988.
(Kranz 2010: 9) 
Like so many other groups then,  the main women’s group did not  advocate 
revolution, but rather reform. Also, while women, like workers and students, 
participated in the demonstrations of September and October 1989, they appear 
to  have  done  so  outside  of  the  context  of  women’s  activism.  Nonetheless, 
groups like Women for Peace contributed to the revolution by showing others 
that protest was possible. 
Democratization Movements
Having fought a nonviolent revolution in the name of democracy, one would 
expect to find a strong democratization movement in the GDR in the 1980s. 
And  while  the  presence  of  grassroots  group  did  increase  after  1986,  “the 
number  of  individuals  engaged  in  some  sort  of  (broadly  defined)  ‘active 
resistance’ reached an estimated 20,000-25,000 each year” (Dale 2005: 124). 
While respectable,  these numbers in no way seemed to spell  trouble for the 
SED, and the Stasi’s estimates of the movement’s strength were even lower. In 
June of 1989, the agency identified 160 opposition groups (mainly pacifists, 
feminists, and environmentalists), 2,500 activists, and 600 people in “leadership 
positions.” Of the 2,500 activists, only 60 were identified as “hardcore activists” 
in a population of 16 million (Stokes 1993: 138). Naturally, the state felt that it 
was in control.
But an opposition did exist, and its momentum slowly began to build after 
Gorbachev assumed power and announced his reform agenda.  Oppositionists 
organized  a  human  rights  seminar  in  Berlin  in  1985  from  which  two 
organizations  emerged:  Gegenstimmen  and  Initiative  für  Frieden  und 
Menschenrechte  (IFM).  IFM,  the  more  important  of  the  two,  was  formally 
established in January 1986. Its membership was made up of peace activists 
who  sensed  that  the  time  might  be  ripe  for  more  aggressive  mobilization. 
Uniquely for its time, IFM’s 
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emphasis was specifically upon democracy and human rights in their political, 
and not social,  aspects. The achievement of a peaceful domestic polity,  IFM 
argued,  requires  the  creation  of  a  ‘critical  public  sphere’ and  this,  in  turn, 
requires guaranteed civil  liberties.  IFM’s concrete demands – for democratic 
elections,  freedom of  association,  and for  a  referendum on nuclear  power – 
tapped into the concerns of many activists. Its magazine,  Grenzfall, reached a 
print-run of around 1,000 but was read by a much wider audience than that 
figure would suggest. IFM was audacious, in that it openly articulated political 
opposition, but also because it dared to step outside the Church. Its publications, 
although  often  printed  in  church  offices,  lacked  the  usual  imprimatur  ‘for 
internal church use only’. As such it was an especially troublesome thorn in the 
government’s  side,  and one that was all  the sharper for its  concern to build 
bridges to other East European dissident movements, such as Charter 77. (Dale 
2005: 127-8)
Besides playing an important role at a time when opposition to the government 
was rare, IFM members were to assume central positions within organizations 
such  as  New  Forum  and  Democracy  Now,  to  which  I  will  return  shortly. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy point to be made about IFM is that its agenda and 
time of emergence coincided with Gorbachev. In short, it can be argued that the 
democratization movement in the GDR sought to take advantage of the new 
situation in Soviet politics (Dale 2005: 126-8). IFM also inspired the creation of 
other groups. For example, “in 1987, [visa] applicants formed a Citizens’ Rights 
group, which was later to affiliate to IFM. Before long it had attracted several 
hundred members, and began to spread nationwide and organize public protests 
in several towns and cities. Applicants were making their presence felt as the 
vanguard of public protest.” (Dale 2005: 88)
While the IFM and a few other groups did what they could to disturb the 
state, it was not until the relationship between the USSR and the GDR began to 
suffer from the former’s desire to reform itself and the latter’s reluctance to 
follow suit that activists seriously began to mobilize (Maier 1997: 173). One of 
the  earliest  groups  to  take  action  was  the  Initiative  Group  for  Life  (IGL). 
Founded by Leipzig Pastors Führer and Wonneberger in 1988 in response to the 
growing number of participants in the weekly Peace Prayers, IGL offered those 
interested “workshops and training in nonviolent direct action” (Nepstad 2011: 
42-3). The group’s first action came late in the evening of January 12, 1989, 
when  IGL  activists  “quietly  distributed  thousands  of  leaflets  calling  for  a 
demonstration at Leipzig’s City Hall” (Nepstad 2011: 43). In response to IGL’s 
call,  a  crowd of  800 gathered on January  17th.  Police  quickly  dispersed the 
crowd and jailed nearly 100 participants, but a precedent had been set, and mass 
action continued to occur, albeit on a relatively limited scale.
From this point on civil society mobilization began to occur more rapidly. 
In March,  dissidents  created the Initiative für  den Demokratischen Aufbruch 
(“Initiative for a Democratic Awakening” or DA) in anticipation of the elections 
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that were to be held in May, and in July the Initiative for a Social Democratic 
Party  in  the  GDR  emerged  (Saxonberg  2001:  305).  In  August,  with  things 
changing quickly throughout Eastern Europe, oppositionists began to calculate 
that free elections may in fact be held relatively soon. In anticipation of such a 
development,  intellectuals  established  Democracy  Now  (DN)  and  “by  late 
August at least seventeen initiatives existed that aimed to establish some sort of 
independent oppositional presence” (Dale 2005: 148). Finally, on September 9th, 
what would become the most important of the opposition groups was founded, 
namely New Forum (NF) (Maier 1997: 136; Reich 1990: 72; Stokes 1993: 139).
Like  its  Czechoslovakian  “role  model”  Charter  77,  NF  sought  to  be 
explicitly anti-political and copied some of Charter 77’s tactics. In its manifesto, 
entitled “Awakening 89,” NF claimed it had no intention of becoming a political 
party, but simply hoped to initiate “a democratic dialogue about the tasks of the 
constitutional  state,  the  economy,  and  of  culture”  (Stokes  1993:  139),  and 
identified its main task as being the harbinger of “communication between state 
and society” (Dale 2005: 148). As one of the founding members of NF points 
out, the organization’s central goal was to be representative of the East German 
people. Consequently, NF, “although not fully balanced, was a cross-section of 
normal people with normal professions and different political leanings” (Reich 
1990: 73). 
New Forum unsuccessfully applied for legal status as an organization, but 
the court’s rejection of this request mattered little as thousands of East Germans 
signed the group’s manifesto and groups of activists established themselves as 
parts of  New Forum throughout the country.  (Dale 2005: 148; Stokes 1993: 
139). By mid-October, a month after its formation, NF boasted 25,000 members 
and 200,000 individuals had signed its manifesto (East 1992: 67; Nepstad 2011: 
46). Still, New Forum played, as we shall see, a rather limited role during the 
revolution, and it was not until roundtable discussions were organized that NF 
emerged as one of the main voices of the people. This is important because it 
suggests  that  even the numerically  most  important  organization  in  the  GDR 
failed to lead the mobilization that occurred in September and October of 1989.
A plethora of democracy organizations came into existence in the fall of 
1989. Dale (2005) explains: 
“Alongside New Forum, DN and IFM, other groups announced their existence, 
notably  the  United  Left  (UL),  Democratic  Awakening  (DA)  and  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  (SDP).  All  of  these  organisations  shared  certain  basic 
principles  and  goals,  notably  democratic  transformation  and  ecological 
sustainability.  That  they did  not  formally unite  was  in  part  due  to  personal 
rivalries and the role  of Stasi  agents in exacerbating these,  but  it  also came 
down to differences in philosophy, programme and strategy. Thus, New Forum, 
IFM, DA and DN drew more upon republican and liberal traditions whereas the 
UL gathered together reform-Communists, Trotskyists and anarchists. DN and 
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DA were  more  affirmative  of  socialism and more  explicitly  opposed to  the 
SED’s “leading role” than was New Forum. As regards organizational form, DA 
and the SDP quickly began to adopt party-political structures while New Forum, 
UL and DN developed along looser, “movement-oriented” lines. (148-9) 
Despite their impressive numbers, no organization appears to have been able to 
take control of the revolution and organize the protests, and the democratization 
struggle thus justifies the epithet of “spontaneous” (Opp, Voss, & Gem 1995). 
This may have some important consequences for how we view democratization 
from below, and I will return to this line of thought in the conclusion. 
Labor Movements
As in the case of Czechoslovakia, the labor movement is most conspicuous by 
its absence. In a country by definition made up by workers, the workers, as a 
coherent group, remained absent in the revolution. It appears their last stand was 
made  as  early  as  the  1953  uprising,  and  that  any  form of  organized  labor 
movement  had  then  disappeared  from  the  political  map.  It  was  not  until 
roundtable discussions were about to begin that the workers offered New Forum 
their support through the promise of a general strike. At this point NF had to 
decide  whether  to  engage  in  dialogue  or  to  put  further  pressure  on  the 
government  by  announcing  the  general  strike.  After  some  deliberation  the 
organization opted for the former and the role of the workers remained minimal 
for the entirety of the transition. Of course, this does not mean that individual 
workers did not participate in the revolution — they did, and in large numbers at 
that — but as an organized group they did not mobilize (Dale 2005: 164; Stibbe 
2006: 43-4). The main reason why the workers as a group remained absent from 
the revolution can be traced to the fact that unions were not independent from 
the state.  Like  the universities,  factories  were under  strict  party control  and 
organization against  the state within the factories would therefore have been 
difficult to accomplish. As Maier (2009) explains, “[factory] associations were 
not organized to contest the regime, but to live in partnership with it” (269).
Student Movements 
“The university was not a major source of protest in 1989” due to the fact that it 
was “too riddled with a younger generation of SED members, often frustrated 
by their unyielding geriatric national leadership, but too hobbled by their party 
affiliation to organize public protests or sing in prayer meetings” (Maier 1997: 
138). Students were locked into the SED, as advancement within the University 
required  party  membership.  Troublesome  students  were  frequently  expelled 
from the universities, which prevented the campuses from becoming political 
hotbeds. One exception to the relative apathy of the students is represented by 
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an  incident  in  1988  when  student-led  protests  occurred  in  response  to  the 
government’s decision to censor a reform-focused issue of the Soviet journal 
Sputnik (Dale 2005: 123). While students may have played a limited role in the 
revolution, intellectuals tried to influence the course of events toward the end of 
the revolution by arguing for the reform of the socialist system rather than a 
more drastic break with the past (Kupferberg 2002: 93-5). 
This  brief  overview of East  German civil  society suggests  that  it  was 
spontaneous  citizens,  rather  than  organized  civil  society,  that  played  an 
important  role  in  the events  of  the late  1980s.  Unlike in  Czechoslovakia,  it 
seems that civil society groups had less impact on the course of events in the 
decade  leading  up  to  the  transition.  For  example,  we  find  no equivalent  of 
Charter  77  or  Solidarity  in  the  GDR.  Even  the  Peace  Prayers,  which  were 
crucial to the revolution, had very low attendance rates before the fall of 1989. 
One scholar even goes so far as to suggest civil society “was not a concept that 
really made sense in the East German context” (Maier 2009: 270). While civil 
society and democratization movements existed and tried to made their voices 
heard, they were not drivers of the revolution in the manner seen elsewhere, as 
the examples of Otpor (Serbia), Kmara (Georgia), and Pora (Ukraine) suggest. 
In  the  words  of  Maier  (2009),  “the  public  protests  did  not  rest  on  long 
preparation and power. … Public protest, we can say, pulled itself up by the 
bootstraps” (265). As Pfaff (2006) summarizes the revolution, “in East Germany 
there were neither elite-led openings nor reformist factions that could move the 
reform cause forward until the popular revolution was already well under way. 
Throughout  the  revolution,  the  opposition  remained  marginal,  weak,  and 
divided” (4). However, this does not negate the fact that civil society groups 
played an important part in showing that mobilization against the state, albeit on 
a very limited scale, was possible in the late 1980s.
Protest
The fact that the 1989 revolution occurred in a largely spontaneous fashion is 
hardly surprising if one considers East Germany’s record of mass protest in the 
second half of the 20th century. Whereas political struggle had been somewhat 
common in the first few years of the GDR’s existence, the communist era was 
characterized by popular acquiescence. In the last three and half decades of the 
East German experiment protest activity was rare. “Sometimes, the political will 
of the people was expressed by organized opposition groups, demonstrations, or 
community and civil action, but usually the struggle went on at the level of the 
individual or family” (Naimark 1992 72-3), what Port has referred to as the 
“repertoire of everyday protest” which consisted of such acts as “the defacing of 
political posters (especially those with images of leading Communist officials), 
the clandestine distribution of oppositional leaflets, and the scribbling of critical 
graffiti in public places” (Port 2007: 120). As Port (2007) has further suggested,
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one of the most striking aspects of the GDR was its remarkable stability: From 
the outside, it appeared to be one of the most stable states in Eastern Europe and 
its population among the most docile.  After the well-known mass uprising of  
June 1953 and before the fall of 1989, there were no major challenges to the  
regime from below – even though … many of the same social, economic, and 
political  grievances  that  had  led  to  the  earlier  upheaval  remained  pervasive 
[emphasis added]. (2) 
Nonetheless,  some exceptions exist.  In 1965 inhabitants of Leipzig rioted in 
response to a ban on certain types of music, including that of the Beatles, and in 
1968 the people of the same city mobilized to prevent the demolition of the 
Universitätskirche  (Opp,  Voss,  and  Gem  1995:  9-10).  Furthermore,  it  is 
imprecise to say that demonstrations were uncommon in the GDR during the 
communist era. Rather, what was uncommon was for such demonstrations to be 
organized by non-state actors. In fact, prior to 1989 citizens were often required 
to participate in state-led demonstrations of various sorts as major events in the 
GDR’s history were commemorated through displays of mass support for the 
state (Opp, Voss, and Gem 1995: 18). Instead of protesting with their mouths, 
people often opted to protest with their feet as episodes of mass exodus were 
relatively  frequent  throughout  East  Germany’s history  (Naimark 1992:  76-7; 
Port 2007: 113).
It was not until 1982 that organized mobilization began to take place, and 
when it did it happened under the protective, but often reluctant, shield offered 
by  the  Church.  As  noted  above,  the  weekly  “peace  prayers”  organized  by 
progressive pastors in Leipzig helped set the stage for a small but burgeoning 
protest culture (Maier 1997: 139). For example, in 1983, visa applicants in Jena 
began to hold vigils in support of their demands for legalized emigration that 
attracted up to 180 people at a time. The choice of tactic suggests that the “exit 
movement” was learning from the church-based peace movement (Dale 2005: 
88). While the peace prayers and actions such as those in Jena did not come 
close to challenging the state’s hegemony, they did attract the attention of the 
authorities, with the Stasi increasing its attention to protest activity throughout 
the country as a consequence (Pfaff 2006). As mentioned previously, however, it 
was not until Gorbachev’s entrance that protest in East Germany took off. As 
Dale (2005) explains, “following a phase of resignation in the middle years of 
the decade,  oppositional activity revived from 1986, buoyed up by the wind 
from Moscow and by  the  developing  ‘anti’ mood.  Demands  for  democratic 
reform could now legitimately appeal to the model being practiced in the Great 
Socialist Brotherland” (124). Exploiting the political opportunity represented by 
the Gorbachev effect, “East Germans began demonstrating for reforms similar 
to those being undertaken in the Soviet Union; and when challenged by police, 
they flaunted Soviet badges and pictures of Gorbachev” (Grieder 2006: 166). 
One  of  the  first  incidents  of  explicitly  pro-democracy  protests  occurred 
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relatively  spontaneously  on  June  8,  1987  when  a  crowd  of  young  people 
assembled at the Brandenburg Gate to enjoy a rock concert held on the other 
side  of  the  wall.  When the  police  moved in  to  disperse  the  youths,  violent 
clashes broke out with the crowd chanting “Gorbi! Gorbi!” and “the Wall most 
go!” (Grieder 2006: 166). 
At this point,  the government seems to have felt  the dual pressures of 
Gorbachev’s reform agenda and popular discontent,  and therefore decided to 
act. On the night of November 24, 1987, security agents raided the offices of the 
Umweltbibliothek in the basement of Berlin’s Zionkirche where IFM printed its 
samizdat publication Grenzfall. Seven people were arrested and the entire office 
was confiscated. As often occurred in episodes of regime repression, the state’s 
actions  backfired  as  the  raid  “ignited  a  wave  of  protests  which  spread 
throughout  Berlin  and  even  beyond  the  GDR.  After  this  time,  the  protest 
movement  grew”  (Opp,  Voss,  and  Gem  1995:  12).  Not  learning  from  its 
mistake,  only weeks later  the regime arrested 160 IFM and Working Group 
protesters carrying banners and placards with quotations from early 20th century 
communist leaders such as Rosa Luxemburg, “freedom is always freedom for 
dissenters”  (Dale  2005:  130;  Grieder  2006:  166).  As  with  the  Zion  Church 
incident,  this  ill-advised  government  action  generated  a  significant  popular 
response, with the Financial Times reporting that “tens of thousands of largely 
non-religious  East  Germans  …  squeezed  into  normally  empty  Protestant 
churches  in  a  powerful  display  of  solidarity”  (Dale  2005:  2005:  130).  In 
response  to  this  incident,  the  Leipzig  Peace  Prayers  were  transformed  into 
solidarity  services  (Dale  2005:  131).  The  state  reacted  furiously  to  the 
politicization of the Peace Prayers and tried to force the Church, which itself 
disapproved of the actions of the activist pastors, to exert greater control over 
these events. In the summer of 1988 the Church consequently sought to take the 
Peace  Prayers  back from the  grassroots  organizations  that  now ran  them in 
collaboration  with  select  clergymen.  Again,  the  state’s  attempt  at  repression 
failed as it immediately sparked resistance.    
Banners protesting the decision were taken into the church, and the altar was 
occupied. On that day, one local pastor recalls, “for the first time, people read a 
public statement in front of the church, namely the statement of the grass-roots 
groups  concerning  this  whole  issue”.  Although  the  Peace  Prayers  had  on 
occasion  spilled  into  the  streets  in  the  early  1980s,  this  event  reminded 
participants “that one can also stage a protest not only inside the church, but 
also in front of it”. In short, the occasion marked an important addition to the  
action repertoire of the grassroots groups, and may be seen as the beginning of  
what  was  to  become  a  series  of  public  demonstrations  …  that  would  
‘spontaneously’ emerge from the Peace Prayers on Mondays, later in 1988 and  
throughout 1989 [emphasis added]. The publicity given to the Peace Prayers, 
moreover, led others to follow suit. In towns across the country similar events 
began to attract hundreds of visitors and came to function as contact points and 
arenas for political discussion. (Dale 2005: 132-3)
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From this point on, the Peace Prayer services became the undisputed loci of 
dissident activity, serving as a sort of “speaker’s corner” where political and 
social questions could be raised at relatively low risk. Pastor Wonneberger had 
taken over responsibility for the services in 1987 after moving to Leipzig from 
Dresden, and immediately began the process of giving activists an increased say 
in the content of the services (Pfaff 2006: 95). Importantly for the outcome of 
the revolution, Wonneberger also helped establish the Initiative Group for Life 
(Initiav-Gruppe-Leben,  IGL) in  1988.  This  group endorsed nonviolent  direct 
action and trained those interested in the topic in a series of workshops (Pfaff 
2006: 95; Nepstad 2011).  
On  January  17,  1988,  peace  and  human  rights  activists  attended  the 
aforementioned state sanctioned demonstrations in honor of Karl Lieberknecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg, two leaders of the abortive communist uprising in Berlin 
in  1919  who  were  later  assassinated.  The  strategy  of  taking  advantage  of 
officially approved commemorations was used from time to time in the last few 
years of the GDR (activists again used the same opportunity in January 1989), 
but  the  regime  did  not  appreciate  the  activists’ use  of  Luxemburg’s  motto 
“Freedom is  always freedom for  dissenters” and arrested  over  a  hundred of 
them Grieder 2006: 166; Naimark 1982: 81). In addition to exploiting officially 
approved  celebrations,  activists  also  took  advantage  of  the  international 
community’s  focused  attention  on  the  GDR.  In  March  of  1989,  during  the 
Leipzig “Open to the World” fair, hundreds of activists marched with placards 
calling for travel rights on the opening day. Before western cameras, the police 
violently broke up the demonstration and arrested many of the protestors. On 
March 13th, these scenes were again repeated in front of foreign journalists as 
850 people demonstrated before the police once more interjected. 
As  noted  above,  some  mobilization  occurred  in  connection  with  the 
fraudulent  May  elections,  but  it  was  not  until  the  Leipzig  Peace  Prayers 
recommenced after the summer break that the revolution’s wheels were set in 
motion. On September 4th, the first Monday service of the season, more than a 
thousand people attended and concluded the evening by protesting in central 
Leipzig.  The  following  week,  police  blocked  off  the  square  (St.  Nicholas) 
outside the St. Nicholas Church where the services were taking place. “When a 
thousand  prayer  service  participants  exited  and  joined  another  thousand 
demonstrators outside the church, security officers ordered them to immediately 
disperse. As the crowd hesitated, the police aggressively arrested 100 people. In 
response, churches throughout East Germany held vigils to pray for the release 
of the prisoners” (Nepstad 2011: 46).
Aided by the spontaneous mobilization efforts of East Germans, fueled by 
an  increasing  sense  of  national  moral  outrage,  events  now  spiraled  out  of 
control  both  for  the  state  and  would-be  organizers.  Sensing  the  moment’s 
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potential danger, on September 25th “Pastor Wonneberger took to the pulpit. In 
front of an audience of thousands, he drew on prophetic inspiration to preach 
stirringly: ‘He who practices violence, who threatens violence and employs it, 
will himself be the victim of that violence’” (Pfaff 2006: 103-4). Clearly the 
pastor recognized that the result of his workshops would soon be put to the test. 
As the crowd entered the streets following the service and grew to 4,000, the 
police, for unknown reasons, made only a few arrests (Nepstad 2011: 46). As 
social movement scholars we might argue that the lack of repression was crucial 
as it is likely to have helped reduce the fears of both protesters and onlookers of 
participating in future events. Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that 
the fact that even in the tense context of September 1989 the Peace Prayers were 
not  either  decisively  broken  up  or  prohibited  contributed  to  the 
institutionalization of the protests: the people of Leipzig not only knew when 
the protests would take place, but had also become familiar with the nonviolent 
methods used (Pfaff 2006: 104-5; Saxonberg 2001: 309)
While the regime did what it could to control the protests, opposition to 
the  state  continued  to  grow.  The  October  2nd Peace  Prayer  (coincidentally 
Gandhi’s  120th birthday)  saw the  largest  crowds  to  date  congregate  outside 
Nikolaikirche with 10,000 people attending the service.  At  this  point  events 
began  to  move  very  quickly.  On  October  7th,  the  SED  celebrated  the  40th 
anniversary of East Germany in Berlin along with dignitaries from 80 countries. 
As  the  state-organized  parade  took  place,  10,000  activists  demonstrated  in 
Berlin. Almost a thousand of them were arrested as the police violently broke up 
the demonstration. In other parts of the country similar events took place with 
protestors  often  chanting  “Gorbi!  Gorbi”  in  a  call  for  help  from the  Soviet 
leader, in Berlin at the time (Naimark 1992: 89; Nepstad 2011: 46). Despite 
repression,  “the  people  were  no  longer  intimidated  and  on  October  8 
demonstrations  took  place  in  Dresden,  Leipzig,  Berlin,  Potsdam,  and  many 
other  towns  and  cities”  (Naimark  1992:  90).  Predictably,  the  protests  were 
broken up by the police, but by now the momentum of the revolution could not 
be stopped (Saxonberg 2001: 311). Nonetheless, the regime pondered a plan to 
put an end to the popular uprising once and for all.
In anticipation of  the Monday Peace Prayers on October 9th,  the SED 
leadership considered a “Chinese solution.” Rumors had spread that the regime 
had  ordered  the  police,  the  military,  and  the  militias  to  use  whatever  force 
necessary  to  break  up  the  Leipzig  demonstrations,  and  the  hospitals  had 
allegedly stocked up on blood. However, when the enormous crowd gathered 
outside the church — estimates vary from 50,000 to 110,000 — the expected 
clash failed to materialize (Dale 2005: 155; Naimark 1992: 92; Saxoberg 2001: 
311).  Opinions vary  as  to  why the  security  forces  didn’t  attack.  Some have 
argued that the police, en masse, simply refused to obey orders to attack the 
crowd when they understood its size and nonviolent demeanor (Nepstad 2011). 
While  it  certainly  mattered  that  prominent  citizens  of  Leipzig,  such  as  the 
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famous  conductor  Kurt  Masur,  negotiated  with  local  SED  leaders  for  the 
security forces to remain peaceful if the crowds did the same (Naimark 1992: 
91; Saxonberg 2001: 312; Stokes 1993: 140), other reasons for the nonviolent 
non-confrontation  between  demonstrators  and  police  must  be  considered  as 
well. I would argue that the most parsimonious explanation is that the regime 
simply never issued orders to use violence against unarmed protesters. Knowing 
that the USSR did not support such action, no SED leader, including Honecker 
and the Stasi chief Mielke, was willing to take responsibility for what promised 
to become an epic bloodbath.  Hoping that  someone else would shoulder the 
burden, no SED official, national or local, appears to have ordered violence to 
be  used  in  Leipzig.  As  the  crowd  remained  nonviolent,  the  security  forces 
responded in kind (Maier 1997: 156; Nepstad 2011: 48; Pfaff 2006: 169-171; 
Saxonberg 2001: 313-4; Stokes 1993: 140). 
The lack of repression on that fateful day secured the regime’s destiny. As 
Stokes  (1993)  concludes,  “the  Leipzig  demonstration  of  October  9  was  the 
crucial moment when the Socialist Unity party lost control of East Germany. 
Convinced now that they were free to vent their frustrations in public, crowds 
began gathering regularly in towns throughout East Germany” (Stokes 1993: 
140). The following Monday (September 16th), 150,000 people participated in 
the  Peace  Prayer,  and  the  week  after,  the  first  Monday  after  Honecker’s 
resignation  on  October  18th,  the  crowd  grew  to  200,000  men,  women  and 
children. On November 6th, half a million people demonstrated in Leipzig and a 
crowd  of  the  same  size  gathered  the  same  day  in  Berlin’s  Alexanderplatz 
(Naimark 1992: 91-2). By early November “opposition also spread from the 
streets to the workplace, where small waves of strikes occurred. The people’s 
demands became stronger and clearer: an end to SED dominance,  genuinely 
free  elections,  and  unrestricted  travel  rights”  (Nepstad  2011:  51).  With  the 
opening of the wall on November 9th and the commencement of roundtable talks 
later that month, the population’s focus shifted away from protest towards the 
task of building a new life in a new society.     
Conclusion
The  East  German  transition  brings  some  interesting  issues  regarding 
“democratization from below” to the fore.  There can be little  doubt that  the 
1989 revolution does not fall into the category of elite-led transitions. In fact, 
the SED leadership remained opposed to reform up until the very end, and only 
chose to reform itself when no other options were available. By that time the 
SED had already lost all of its power and the transition was well on its way. In 
short, the East German revolution does indeed constitute “democratization from 
below.”
But what is the nature of the East German “below?” This report suggests 
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that civil society organizations, while present, were too weak to take charge of 
the revolution, even when organizations like NF were offered leadership on a 
silver platter in October 1989. The reason for this weakness may be related to 
the incredibly short history of most  East German civil  society organizations. 
Unlike  Civil  Forum,  which  grew out  of  Charter  77  and benefited  from the 
charismatic  leadership  of  Vaclav  Havel,  New  Forum  lacked  an  equivalent 
history.  While  some  of  its  leaders  and  members  had  been  involved  in 
organizations  such  as  the  IFM,  neither  the  “parent  organizations”  nor  the 
members themselves had enough clout to assume leadership of the revolution, 
leaving the uprising both leaderless and spontaneous. 
But does the absence of organized leadership make the revolution any 
less of a “bottom-up” affair? I  would probably argue the opposite.  The East 
German revolution was truly an example of “democratization from below” as it 
depended not on vanguards or organized efforts by counter-elites, but simply on 
individuals’ willingness  to  stand  up  against  the  regime.  The revolution  also 
suggests that in the face of such spontaneous mobilization, seemingly powerful 
regimes can collapse in a matter of weeks.  It is however important to remember 
that the uprising did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. The fact that Moscow 
had  made  it  absolutely  clear  to  Berlin  that  it  would  stand  alone  if  it  used 
violence against protesters probably represents the central explanatory factor of 
the revolution.  Without  Soviet  support  Honecker and his  colleagues realized 
that they were doomed, and allowed themselves to be swept away by nonviolent 
revolutionaries. 
That said, civil  society organizations did play an important role in the 
revolution.  The  natural  evolution  of  a  weak,  young,  but  still  present 
democratization movement can be traced back to the religious/peace/ecological 
movement  that  preceded  it.  Before  the  masses  gathered  in  their  tens  of 
thousands in Leipzig and Berlin, it was the small groups of dedicated activists 
that helped establish a protest culture in East Germany by showing that while 
difficult  and  costly,  the  regime  could  still  be  challenged.  Furthermore,  the 
repression  of  these  “early  risers”  contributed  to  the  moral  outrage  of  the 
population at large and thus to the mobilization of massive demonstrations in 
the fall of 1989.         
One  final  observation  concerns  the  shocking  weakness  of  the  East 
German state. The GDR was considered one of the most stable and repressive 
regimes in the Eastern Bloc. However, once the withdrawal of Soviet support 
coincided with a nonviolent, human rights-based popular uprising, the regime 
was left with no viable chance for survival. In hindsight, the collapse may seem 
unsurprising, even expected, but at the time few people anticipated the state’s 
collapse and even the demonstrators themselves were largely content to demand 
reform, not revolution. But given other cases of nonviolent revolutions, such the 
shah’s Iran, Czechoslovakia in 1989, and Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, we should 
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perhaps not be amazed to find that seemingly invincible dictatorships can fall 
like houses of cards when their international support structures collapse. 
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